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Proving Natural Resource Damage Under
OPA 90: Out with the Rebuttable
Presumption, in with APA-Style
Judicial Review?
Craig H. Allen*
In the afdtmnath of the Deepwater Honrzon oil spill of 2010, Prsident Obama uged
Congess to amend the natural rsoure damage provisions of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to
rplace the rebuttable prsumpdon of val&ty the law presently accords to damage assessments
by the designated natural resouwe trustees that ve conducted in accordance with rgulations
promulgated by the National Oceanic and Atmosphenc Administration with the standard of
jui&cial eviewp-rsornbed by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Although the House of
Representatives passed such an amendment ma 2010, the Senate failed to act on the amendment
before the 111th congressional term ended Nevertheless, WhVte House and congwssional
support in the wake of the 2010 spill suggests that the proposal is likely to resurface in the near
future. Accordingly this Article examines the meaning and effect of the proposed substitution
ofAPA review for the existing rebuttable presumption, potential &irfculties in implementing the
new standard and whether the amendment might unconstitutionally deprive spillems of the ight
to ajuiy tial.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, forty-one miles off the coast of Louisiana, an
explosion ripped through the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater
Horizon,' just as the rig was wrapping up the drilling phase of one of
the country's "deepwater" outer continental shelf (OCS) 2 wells for the
lead operator of the site, BP Exploration and Production,
Incorporated.' The explosion and fire took the lives of eleven workers
on the Deepwater Horizon, injured seventeen others, and opened the
new wellhead to the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. When the well's
blowout preventer failed, crude oil spewed into the Gulf waters at a rate
estimated at 1000, 5000, and then more than 35,000 barrels (1.47
million gallons) per day.4 As the oil spread across the Gulf, the
1. Deepwater Horizon was an ultra-deepwater, dynamically positioned, semi-
submersible drilling rig built in 2001. The rig, flagged in the Marshall Islands and classed by
the American Bureau of Shipping, was owned by Transocean, Ltd. On April 22, 2010, the rig
sank in 5000 feet of water, about one-quarter of a mile northwest of the well.
2. The lease was issued by the Department of Interior's Minerals Management
Service pursuant to authority granted by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1356 (2006); 30 C.F.R. pt. 260 (2010). See genemllyADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 33404, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL FRAMEWORK (2010).
3. BP Exploration and Production, Inc., is a subsidiary of BP plc (formerly known
as "British Petroleum"). The lease area from which the oil was spilled, known to the relevant
players as the "Macondo" site, is formally designated as Mississippi Canyon Block 252.
4. One barrel is equal to 42 U.S. gallons. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(2) (2006). National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) scientists were criticized early on for
estimates of the oil spilled that other scientists concluded were unreasonably low. See Justin
Gillis, Doubts Are Raised on Accuracy of Govemrnmenth Spill Estimate, N.Y TIMES, May 14,
2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/us/14oil.html. In contrast to
estimates of discharges from tanks, tankers, or pipelines, where the quantities of oil in the
system before and after the discharge are known or measurable, accurate estimates for
discharges from oil wells are more difficult to make. Eventually, the government formed a
twenty-two-member Flow Rate Technical Group to provide more accurate estimates of the oil
being discharged. See Flow Rate Group Provides Prelimnary Best Estinate of Oil Flowing
from BP Oil Well, RESTORETHEGULF.GOv (May 27, 2010), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) closed
offshore fisheries from the mouth of the Mississippi River east to
Florida's Pensacola Bay.'
On April 29, the Secretary of Homeland Security signaled the
urgency and magnitude of the situation when she declared the incident
a "spill of national significance" (SONS) and appointed Coast Guard
Admiral Thad Allen the National Incident Commander.' By mid-May,
the response team of 20,000 personnel and 950 vessels had deployed
over 1.8 million feet of containment boom, injected nearly 600,000
gallons of oil dispersant into the waters and had recovered more than
7.65 million gallons of oil.' Yet, through May and June, the oil
continued to gush out, severely challenging the growing flotilla of
response resources. Some analysts predicted that it was only a matter
of time before the oil reached the Atlantic Ocean and foreign state
waters.
The well was not capped until mid-July.' By that time, an
estimated 4.9 million barrels (205.8 million gallons) of crude oil had
been released into the marine environment,"o leaving many wondering
how much remained to be cleaned up. The federal government's
release/2010/05/27/flow-rate-group-provides-preliminary-best-estimate-oil-flowing-bp-oil-
well.
5. By May 18, 2010, over 45,000 square miles of the U.S. waters of the Gulf (nearly
nineteen percent of the total) were closed to fishing. See NOAA Extends Fishing Closed
Azea, NOAA (May 18, 2010), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20100518
closure.html.
6. For the consequences of a SONS designation, see 40 C.ER. § 300.323 (2009).
7. Daily inventories of response resources were posted on the Deepwater Horizon
Unified Command's Web site, Current Opeations, REsToRETHEGuLF.GOV, http://www.
restorethegulf.gov/response/current-operations (last updated Jan. 13, 2011).
8. On July 30, 2010, NOAA concluded that there was no risk of oil pollution to the
Florida Keys or the U.S. east coast. See NOAA: Gulfk Surface Oil Nota Threat to Southern
Floida, Keys, andEast Coast NOAA (July 30, 2010), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories
1010/20100730 threat.html.
9. On August 4, 2010, following a test evaluation of the so-called "static kill"
procedure used to temporarily cap the well in mid-July, BP was authorized to cement the
well. See Statement by National Incident Commander Admial Thad Allen,
RESTORETHEGULF.GOV (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/04/
statement-national-incident-commander-admiral-thad-allen. Six weeks later, following
completion and testing of the relief well, Admiral Allen declared that "the Macondo 252 well
is effectively dead." Statement from Adniral Allen on the Successful Completion of the
Relief Well, RESTORETHEGULF.GOV (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.restorethegulfgov/release/
2010/09/19/statement-national-incident-commander-admiral-thad-allen.
10. See JANE LUBCHENCo, NOAA ET AL., BP DEEPWATER HORIoZN OIL BUDGET:
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OI? 3 (2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/
2010/09/09/bp-deepwater-horizon-oil-budget-what-happened-oil.
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surprisingly low estimate of the amount of oil remaining in the water"
came under immediate attack by scientists and environmentalists,
undermining public confidence in the federal government's oil spill
experts.1
Soon after it became apparent that oil was leaking from the well,
the President (through the Coast Guard) designated the Macondo well
as the "source" of the oil and BP was notified that it was considered
the legally "responsible party" for the spill." As such, BP was subject
to liability under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) for the costs
of removing the oil and for damages caused by the spill. Under OPA
90 as presently written, an offshore facility operator's liability for
removal costs is unlimited; however, its liability for damages caused by
the incident is limited to $75 million.14 There are, however, several
grounds, proof of which can result in imposition of unlimited liability
for damages under OPA 90. In addition, OPA 90 does not preempt
state liability laws, some of which impose unlimited liability." As it
turned out, however, resorting to those alternatives was rendered
largely unnecessary after BP announced that it would take full
responsibility for the oil spill damages, notwithstanding the OPA 90
limits of liability, and followed through by establishing a $20 billion
claims fund."
11. See id The August 2, 2010, report, prepared by NOAA and the U.S. Geological
Survey, and later defended by NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco, estimated that only
26% of the oil discharged from the well remained in the water. It concluded that, of the
estimated 205.8 million gallons of oil discharged, 17% was captured directly from the well
head; 5% was burned; 3% was skimmed; 24% was either chemically or naturally dispersed,
and 25% either evaporated or dissolved.
12. See John Collins Rudolf, Scientists Tussle over Gulf Oil Tally, N.Y TIMEs GREEN
BLOG (Aug. 17, 2010, 6:24 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/tussle-over-gulf-
oil-tally-drags-on/.
13. See 33 U.S.C. § 2714 (2006); 33 C.ER. § 136.305 (2010) (designating the source
and notification to responsible party). Because the sunken Deepwater Horizon was presumed
to be leaking oil from onboard tanks (which contained 700,000 gallons of diesel fuel), the
vessel was designated a source of oil and the vessel's owner, Transocean, was designated the
responsible party. At this time it is uncertain whether any of the oil from the vessel has, in
fact, escaped. Given the principal "source" of the oil and its "responsible party," it is more
accurate to refer to the incident at the "BP Macondo spill" rather than the Deepwater Horizon
spill.
14. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3). The $75 million limit on liability for damages has not
been adjusted since OPA 90 was enacted. "Offshore facility" is defined in 33 U.S.C.
§ 2701(22). "Outer Continental Shelf facility" is defined in 33 U.S.C. § 2701(25).
15. See id. § 2718(a)(1). For an example of unlimited oil spill liability under state
law, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.56.370 (West 2011).
16. See Ben Feller, BP Agrees to $20B Fund for Spill Victims, WASH. TIMES, June
16, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/16/bp-executives-arrive-meeting-
obama/.
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No sooner had the public and private components of the national
response system mobilized to arrest the discharge and contain and
remove the escaped oil than the inevitable images of living and other
natural resource casualties hit the news services. Endangered and
threatened turtle species" and recently recovered pelican and other bird
species were early victims of the spill. Coastal states from Texas to
Florida girded for the coming onslaught of oil on their beaches and in
their coastal wetlands. The unfolding disaster mobilized another group
of players: natural resource trustees, whom OPA 90 charged with
representing federal, state, tribal, and foreign interests in assessing the
damage to natural resources and implementing appropriate restoration.
NOAA took the lead in assessing the spill's impact on fish, shellfish,
marine mammals, turtles, birds, and other sensitive resources, as well
as their habitats.'"
Awakened from its twenty-year hiatus on marine environmental
protection oversight and legislative development, Congress moved
swiftly to fix the blame. Calling in oil company executives and various
government officials, committees in both houses held televised
hearings during which they expressed shock that drilling for oil in
waters roughly one mile deep and more than forty miles offshore
posed unique technological challenges and a higher degree of oil spill
risk. 9 Legislative bills with election-year titles like the "Big Oil
Bailout Prevention Act of 2010"2o promised anxious voters sweeping
changes to the OCS leasing and oil spill liability regimes.2'
17. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FEDERALLY LISTED WILDLIFE AND PLANTS
THREATENED BY GULF OIL SPILL (2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/home/dhoilspill/
pdfs/FedListedBirdsGulf.pdf.
18. See genemlyDEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL TRUSTEE CouNcIL, NRDAR: How
IT WORKS (2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/home/dhoilspill/pdfs/NRDARHowIt
Works.pdf (describing the Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration process
and participants, including the fourteen technical working groups established for the spill).
19. See Jad Mouawad & Barry Meier, Risk-Taking Rises as Oil Rigs in Gulf Drill
Deeper, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/business/energy-
environment/30deep.html (reporting that the risks are "largely unscrutinized").
20. H.R. 5214, 111th Cong. (2010) (introduced by Rep. Rush Holt and 84 cosponsors
on May 5, 2010); see also Big Oil Bailout Prevention Liability Act of 2010, S. 3305, 111th
Cong. (2010) (introduced by Sen. Robert Menendez and twenty-three cosponsors on May 24,
2010). On June 9, 2010, Senator Menendez took his reform proposal one step further in S.
3472, which he styled the "Big Oil Bailout Prevention Unlimited Liability Act of 2010." S.
3472, 111th Cong. (2010).
21. The reformists frequently decried the $75 million limit of liability for damages
caused by an incident involving an offshore facility, often comparing that figure to the higher
limits applicable to vessels and onshore facilities. They failed to acknowledge, however, that
the higher OPA 90 limits applicable to vessels and onshore facilities apply to both removal
costs and damages. The offshore facility owner's liability for removal costs is presently
2011] 1043
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On May 12, 2010, the White House transmitted to Congress an
executive branch postspill legislative package.22 Like the many bills
already introduced in Congress, the President's legislative package
proposed an increase in the spiller's oil spill liability and the per-
incident and natural resource damage (NRD) claim limits on
expenditures from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. In addition, the
White House proposed a new standard of review for natural resource
damage assessments made by designated trustees. Instead of the
rebuttable presumption accorded to damage assessments under the
current law, if the assessment is conducted in accordance with NOAA's
regulations for assessing natural resource damage, the White House
proposed to substitute judicial review under standards prescribed by
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)." The President's proposal
was taken up by Rep. James Oberstar, who included it in H.R. 5629 on
June 29, 2010.24 An identical provision was eventually included in
H.R. 3534 (the CLEAR Act), which passed the House by a narrow
margin on July 30, 2010.25 H.R. 3534 was placed on the Senate
calendar on August 4, 2010; however, the Senate failed to take action
on it before the 111th Congress ended. Although no similar
amendment has yet been introduced in the current Congress, White
House support for the amendment suggests the issue will likely
resurface.
This Article examines the judicial review proposal in the White
House's postspill legislative package and H.R. 3534, with particular
attention to potential difficulties in applying an APA-style review to
NRD determinations and assessments. It also examines whether
limiting the scope of challenges to affirmative claims for NRD in this
way might conflict with any applicable right to a jury trial. Part II of
the Article provides a general background on oil spill liability. Part III
unlimited. Accordingly, in the case of the BP spill, the company's liability under the current
law for cleanup costs and damages will plainly run into the billions.
22. Letter from Barack Obama, President, to Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the
House (May 12, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
budget amendments/supplemental 05-12_10.pdf.
23. Id. at 21 (enclosure).
24. Oil Spill Accountability and Environmental Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 5629,
111th Cong. (2010).
25. Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, H.R. 3534,
111th Cong., tit. III, § 706 (2009). The bill passed 209 yea to 193 no. See also H.R. REP No.
111-575, pt. 1 (2010). The senate failed to take companion action before the 111th Congress
adjourned. Although no similar measure has yet been introduced in the 112th Congress,
strong White House support for the amendment in the wake of the Gulf oil spill suggests that
reform efforts are likely to resume in the current session.
1044 [Vol. 85:1039
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then describes the present and proposed legal framework relevant to a
natural resource trustee's "proof" of damage resulting from an oil spill
incident. Next, Part IV examines some of the issues raised by the
proposed change, including the appropriateness of an APA standard of
review to natural resource damage assessment and its potential effect
on any relevant rights to a jury trial.
II. RESPONSIBLE PARTY LIABILITY FOR "DAMAGES" CAUSED BY
AN OIL SPILL
The 1989 oil spill from the EXXON VALDEZ demonstrated that
the United States lacked adequate resources, including federal funds,
to respond to significant oil spills.26 It also became apparent that the
existing hodgepodge of statutory and decisional law provided only
poorly defined and limited compensation for those harmed by oil
spills. Congress responded with OPA 90.27 While largely leaving
intact the discharge prohibitions and penalties in the Clean Water Act,28
Congress substantially revised and codified the oil spill liability
scheme. Title I of OPA 90 significantly expanded the range of
compensable damages and raised the responsible party's limits of
liability, while Title IX bolstered the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
OPA 90's liability provisions apply to discharges in the navigable
waters of the United States, including the territorial sea and the
1 * *29
exclusive economic zone.
Until 1990, the natural resource damage liability and cost
recovery scheme for oil spills in U.S. navigable waters was defined by
federal maritime law, as modified by the 1972 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and state law.30 Claimants invoked a number of common
26. In 1980, CERCLA enacted broad reforms to the parallel legal framework for
releases of hazardous substances. See Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006)). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) imposes liability for injury to, or
destruction or loss of, natural resources.
27. See Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990). The legislative history of the Oil
Pollution Act is collected, in part, in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722.
28. See, e g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319 (2006) (civil and criminal penalties); id. 1321
(discharge prohibitions).
29. See id. §§ 2701(8), (21), 2702(a).
30. Prior to 1990, liability for oil spills in navigable waters of the United States was
established by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 311, 94
Stat. 2767 (1972), amended by Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 58, 91 Stat. 1566
(1977). The allowable "costs of removal" included those costs or expenses incurred by the
federal or state governments in the restoration or replacement of natural resources damaged
or destroyed as a result of a discharge. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4). In addition, recovery was
allowed for natural resource damage under various state law or general maritime law theories.
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law theories, including parens patriae, public trust doctrine, and
nuisance. In response to the EXXON VALDEZ incident, after which
the federal and Alaska state governments settled their natural resource
damage claims against Exxon for $900 million,32 Congress moved to
codify much, but not all, of the law on natural resource damage from
oil spills. Importantly, in enacting OPA 90 Congress expressly "saved"
application of state law and admiralty and maritime law." Thus, those
evolving bodies of law may yet provide a basis for natural resource
damage remedies. At the same time, however, given the seaward reach
of its liability regime, OPA 90's consistency with relevant international
law-particularly the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea-must also be considered.34
A. Responsible PartyLiability for "Damages" Under OPA 90
OPA 90 imposes liability on the responsible party (RP)" for the
costs of removal and certain specified "damages."36 Those "damages"
31. See, e.g., Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F Supp. 1097, 1098-99, 1973 AMC 1131,
1131-32 (D. Me. 1973) (paens patrise); Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 E Supp.
1060, 1065-66, 1974 AMC 1003, 1009-11 (D. Md. 1972) (public trust doctrine); In re
Oswego Barge Corp., 439 E Supp. 312, 314-15, 1978 AMC 392, 393-94 (N.D.N.Y. 1977)
(nuisance); see also Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 672, 1981 AMC 2185,
2212 (1st Cir. 1980) ("An oil spill on the navigable waters is a breach of federal maritime law.
Where the injury occurs in the territorial waters of a state, the general rule is that admiralty
will give broad recognition of the authority of the States to create rights and liabilities with
respect to conduct within their borders, when the state action does not run counter to federal
laws or the essential features of an exclusive federal jurisdiction." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
32. SeeAgreement and Consent Decree, United States v. Exxon Corp., Nos. A91-082
& A91-083 (D. Alaska Oct. 19, 1991), available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universall
Documents/History/Agree_.CD.pdf.
33. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2718(a), 2751(e). One district court has held that the only
maritime law claims "preserved" under 33 U.S.C. § 2751 are "admiralty claims which are not
addressed in OPA." Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atl. Corp., 924 F
Supp. 1436, 1447, 1996 AMC 2604, 2618 (E.D. Va. 1996) (holding that "[b]ecause OPA
provides a comprehensive scheme for the recovery of oil spill cleanup costs and the
compensation of those injured by oil spills, the general maritime law does not apply to
recovery of these types of damages"), afg 122 E3d 1062, 1998 AMC 163 (4th Cir. 1997).
34. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS Convention]. Although the United States is not a
party to the UNCLOS Convention, it considers much of the convention binding as a matter of
customary law. See Presidential Statement on United States Ocean Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983). The UNCLOS Convention does not expressly address
coastal State jurisdiction to impose liability for oil discharges in the State's Exclusive
Economic Zone. SeeUNCLOS Convention, supra, arts. 56(1)(b)(iii), 229, 235(2)-(3), 304.
35. "Responsible party" is defined in 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32).
36. Id. § 2702. The Act defines "damages" to include the cost of assessing those
damages. Id. § 2701(5).
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include any injury to natural resources, loss of personal property (and
resultant economic losses), loss of subsistence use of natural resources,
lost revenues resulting from destruction of property or natural resource
injury, lost profits resulting from property loss or natural resource
injury, and the costs of providing extra public services during or after
the spill response."
The RP's liability under OPA 90 is strict," but subject to certain
enumerated affirmative defenses" and a complex schedule of statutory
limits.40 The statutory limits may, however, be "broken." Under the
"exceptions" to limited liability in 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c), the RP's
liability limits may be.broken if
(1) ... the incident" was proximately caused 42 by-
(A) gross negligence or willful misconduct of, or
(B) the violation of an applicable Federal safety, construction,
or operating regulation by, the responsible party, an agent
or employee of the responsible party, or a person acting
pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible
party[; or]
37. Id. § 2702(b).
38. See id. §§ 1321(f) (strict liability under the CWA), 2701(17) (incorporating the
Clean Water Act liability provision); see also Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264,
266 (5th Cir. 2001); Metlife Capital Corp. v. M/V Emily S., 132 E3d 818, 820, 1998 AMC
635, 638 (1st Cir. 1997).
39. 33 U.S.C. § 2703.
40. Id. § 2704; see also Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Updegraff, 147 E3d 1344, 1347,
1998 AMC 2409, 2411-12 (11th Cir. 1998). Title VI of the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2006 increased the limits of liability for vessels but not for offshore
facilities. Pub. L. No. 109-241, § 603, 120 Stat. 516, 553-54 (2006) (amending 33 U.S.C.
§ 2704). The Act did, however, require the secretary to produce annual reports, which among
other things, was intended to ensure the liability limits were periodically reassessed to
determine whether they were adequate to the risk. Id. § 603(c). OPA 90 does not permit
recovery of punitive damages and it has been held to preempt punitive damage claims under
general maritime law. See S. Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. P'ship, 234 F3d 58, 64-65,
2001 AMC 609, 617 (1st Cir. 2000); Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 171 F Supp. 2d 1127,
1133 (D. Or. 2001). ButseeExxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2618-19, 2008
AMC 1521, 1531-32 (2008) (holding that the Clean Water Act's water pollution penalties, 33
U.S.C. § 1321, do not preempt punitive damages awards in maritime spill cases).
41. "'[I]ncident' means any occurrence or series of occurrences having the same
origin, involving one or more vessels, facilities, or any combination thereof, resulting in the
discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil." 33 U.S.C. § 2701(14).
42. Congress considered the question of proximate causation particularly important.
See H.R. REP. No. 101-242, at 30-31 (1989). The proximate cause test has also been adopted
by the Supreme Court as the standard of causation under the Admiralty Jurisdiction
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 109-304, 120 Stat. 1485 (2006) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 30101
(2006)); see Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 536-
37, 1995 AMC 913, 920-21 (1995). The superseding cause "wrinkle" of the proximate cause
doctrine was analyzed by the Court in Exxon Co. v Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 836-39, 1996
AMC 1817, 1821-23 (1996).
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(2) . . . the responsible party fails or refuses-
(A) to report the incident .. .;
(B) to provide all reasonable cooperation and assistance
requested by a responsible official in connection with
removal activities; or
(C) without sufficient cause, to comply with an order issued
under [33 U.S.C. § 1321](c) or (e) . . . .4
Additionally, the Act does not preempt additional or even unlimited
liability under state law." Injured parties may bring OPA 90 claims for
removal costs or damages directly against the RP or against the RP's
guarantor.45 If there are multiple RPs, liability is joint and several."
B. The Oil Spi Liability Trust Fund
The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Fund) was originally
established in 1986; however, it was largely unfunded until Congress
enacted OPA 90, consolidating existing funds and imposing a tax to
replenish the Fund.47 The Fund is administered by the National
Pollution Funds Center (NPFC).48 The original 1990 Act imposed a
five-cent/barrel tax on oil imports to support the Fund and established
an upper limit both on the Fund and on the amount that could be paid
out for each incident.49 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 raised the limit
of the Fund to $2.7 billion,"o and the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 increased the per-barrel tax rate to eight cents
43. 33 U.S.C. § 2704.
44. Id. § 2718(a)(1).
45. Seeid. §2716(f).
46. See id. § 2702(a), which provides that "each" responsible party is liable for the
relevant removal costs and damages, up to the limits of liability in the Act. The Act also
includes provisions for contribution. See id. §§ 2709, 2717(f)(3). Joint and several liability,
which has long been a principle in general maritime law, is confirmed by OPA 90's legislative
history. SeeH.R. REP.No. 101-653, 102 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 780; S.
REP.No. 101-94, at 11 (1989), repritedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 733.
47. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, tit. VIII,§ 8033(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 1959 (1986). OPA 90 repealed the former Offshore Oil Spill
Pollution Fund and consolidated the remaining funds in the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1824 (1988) (repealed by the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, tit. II, § 2004, 104 Stat. 484, 507 (1990)).
48. See Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757, 54,766 (Oct. 22, 1991). The
NPFC is an independent Coast Guard unit that serves as fiduciary for the OSLTF. The
center's claims procedures are set out in 33 C.ER. pt. 136 (2010).
49. See 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2006); JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
OIL SPILLS IN U.S. COASTAL WATERS: BACKGROUND, GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS 15-17 (2010).
50. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1361, 119 Stat. 594, 1058-59 (2005) (amending 26 U.S.C.
§ 4611(f) (2000)).
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through 2016." Although the Fund will be rebuilt to $2.7 billion, OPA
90 still limits the amount that can be committed to a single spill to $1
billion overall, of which not more than $500 million is available for
natural resource damages.52
With limited exceptions, any claim for removal costs or damages
must first be presented to the RP or the RP's guarantor before it may
be presented to the NPFC for payment from the Fund." Presentment
to the RP is also a prerequisite to filing a civil action against the RP in
court.' Claimants may assert claims against the Fund or file suit in
court ninety days after filing their claims with the RP or immediately if
the RP denies all liability for the claim." A claimant, including a
natural resource damage (NRD) trustee claimant, may not present a
claim against the Fund if it has already filed a lawsuit against the RP
for those same damages.
C Responsible PartyLiability forNatuml Resources Damages
The "polluter pays" principle, which advocates measures for
imposing liability and a duty of compensation for the adverse effects
of "environmental damage,"" has been only partially implemented in
international law." By expressly imposing upon the RP liability for
"injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural resources,"59
51. See Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div.
B, § 405, Oct. 3, 2008, 122 Stat. 3765, 3860 (2008).
52. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2).
53. See33 U.S.C. § 2713(c) (2006); 33 C.F.R. § 136.103(c).
54. See 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a); Boca Ciega Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 51 E3d
235, 240 (11th Cir. 1995) (dismissing plaintiffs' suit after holding that presentment under 33
U.S.C. § 2713(a) is a prerequisite to suit).
55. See33 U.S.C. § 2713(c); 33 C.ER. § 136.103(c).
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 2713(d); 33 C.F.R. § 136.103(d).
57. See, e.g., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 13, June 14,
1992,31 I.L.M. 874.
58. See, e.g., International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, art. 4, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57
[hereinafter Fund Convention]; International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, arts. I, III, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CLC]. In imposing liability
for environmental damage, the CLC provides that "compensation for impairment of the
environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of
reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken." Protocol To
Amend the CLC, art. 1.6, Nov. 27, 1992, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255; see CLC, supm, arts. 1.6
(defining "pollution damage"), III (liability for "pollution damage"). The United States is not
a party to the CLC or Fund conventions.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A). "Natural Resources" are defimed in 33 U.S.C.
§ 2701(20). The purpose of imposing NRD liability is compensatory, not punitive. See
generally VALERIE ANN LEE, PJ. BRIDGEN & ENV'T INT'L LTD., THE NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT DESKBOOK: A LEGAL AND TEcHNICAL ANALYSIS 49-50 (2002); Charles
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OPA 90 comes closer to realizing that principle, but it applies only to
oil spill incidents and does not address the vast quantities of nutrients,
pesticides, pathogens, acidifiers, and other pollutants that find their
way into the ocean from rivers, outfalls, aquaculture farms, and the
atmosphere.60 Before a party can be held liable for any of OPA 90's
remedies, including the legal component of a natural resource damage
remedy, the party asserting the claim must prove that (1) the defendant
is a "responsible party" (2) for the ship or facility (3) from which oil
was discharged (4) into or upon covered waters or adjoining
shorelines, and (5) that an injury to natural resources "resulted from"
the incident."
The amount of compensation allowed for NRD claims is the cost
of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of the
damaged natural resources and the reasonable cost of assessing
damages. Only natural resource trustees have standing to assert
claims for damage to natural resources." Trustees for natural resources
belonging to, managed or controlled by, or appertaining to the federal
government (federal trustees) are designated by the President;" state
trustees by the governors; and tribal trustees by the governing body of
the affected tribes." Provision is also made for foreign governments to
designate trustees where an incident damages natural resources of the
foreign state."
For "damage" claims, including claims for natural resource
damage, the damage must "result from" the spill incident." At the
same time, however, because liability is joint and several, the fact that
B. Anderson, Damage to Nataral Resources and the Cost ofRestoration, 72 TUL. L. REv. 417
(1997); James L. Nicoll, Jr., Marine Pollution and Natural Resource Damages: The Multi-
Million DollarDamageAwardand Beyona' 5 U.S.E MAR. L.J. 323 (1993).
60. See generallyUNCLOS Convention, supia note 34, art. 1.14 (defining "pollution
of the marine environment").
61. See33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
62. Id. § 2706(c).
63. Id § 2702(c)(1)(A).
64. Federal trustees are listed in the National Contingency Plan. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.600 (2009). For marine spills, the majority of federal natural resources come under the
Department of Commerce (NOAA) or Department of Interior (FWS). Where there is more
than one federal trustee for a given incident, Executive Order 12,777 requires appointment of
a "Lead Administrative Trustee." Exec. Order No. 12,777, supra note 48, at 54,759; 56 Fed.
Reg. 54,759 (Oct. 22, 1991); 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(a) (2010).
65. See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b); 40 C.F.R. § 300.605, 300.610. The trustees' functions
and duties are prescribed in 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c) and the National Contingency Plan. See 40
C.F.R. § 300.615.
66. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(5).
67. Id. §§ 2702(a) (removal costs and damages that "result from" the incident),
2706(e)(1).
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there may have been other concurrent causes of the damage may give
the RP a right of contribution,' but it should not constitute a defense to
liability.69  The 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) adopts identical "result
from" language in its provisions on liability for natural resource
damage in cases involving the release of a hazardous substance."
Given the lack of cases that construe the "result from" causation
standard in a claim under the NRDA section of OPA 90, analogous
CERCLA cases may be persuasive authority in construing the OPA 90
standard." The CERCLA cases are not entirely consistent, however.
One district court, applying the CERCLA standard to an NRD claim,
held that the trustee need only prove that the release was a
"contributing factor."" Another district court construed CERCLA to
require the NRD claimant to "show a defendant's release ... was the
sole or substantially contributing cause of each alleged injury to
natural resources.""
Among other things, NOAA's regulations on NRD assessments
and restoration require trustees espousing NRD claims to "determine if
injuries to natural resources and/or services have resulted from the
incident."74 In the subsequent challenge to the NOAA final rule in the
68. Id § 2709.
69. SeeCoeur d'Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc., 280 E Supp. 2d 1094, 1119-21 (D. Idaho
2003), modifieg United States v. Asarco Inc., 471 E Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Idaho 2005) (relying
on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(1) (1965) and rejecting joint and several
liability for natural resource damages under CERCLA where there was a reasonable basis for
allocating the damage among the potentially responsible parties).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006). Accordingly, CERCLA cases on NRD claims,
some of which adopt a relaxed causation standard or suggest the need for a reversal of the
burden of proof, may serve as persuasive but not binding authority on OPA 90 NRD liability.
See, eg., In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 722 E Supp. 893, 897 (D. Mass.
1989); BRLAN D. ISRAEL, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 32B.05[4] (2010).
71. CL United States v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., NO. A94-0391-CV, 1997 WL
612790, 1997 AMC 2333, 2348 (D. Alaska Mar. 31, 1997) (determining an RP's liability for
removal costs under the "result from" statutory causation element by adopting a "nexus"
requirement, which the government could satisfy by showing either "cause in fact" or "but
for" causation), affit 172 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1999). Interestingly, the court treated its
causation discussion as a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact.
72. In reAcushnetRiver, 722 E Supp. at 897.
73. United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., No. CV 90 3122-AAH, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10128, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1991); see also Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 E
Supp. 665, 674 (D. Idaho 1986) (holding that strict liability does not abrogate the necessity of
showing causation and "the damage for which recovery is sought must still be causally linked
to the act of the defendant"). See generally James R. MacAyeal, The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lihbilty Act: The Coract Paradgr of Strict
Liability and the Problem of Individual Causation, 18 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 217
(2000/2001).
74. 15 C.ER. § 990.5 1(a) (2010).
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the petitioners' position
that the trustee could meet its proof requirement merely by
demonstrating "injury," "exposure," and a "pathway" failed to satisfy
the court. 5 NOAA's brief conceded that "[t]he trustee must establish
causation to the satisfaction of the district court'"" a position the
agency reiterated during oral argument, while also acknowledging that
this interpretation of the final rule would bind the agency in any future
proceedings." The court expressly adopted NOAA's construction of its
final rule that the trustee must "prove causation.""
An action for natural resource damages under OPA 90 must be
brought within three years of the date of completion of the natural
resources damage assessment." The assessment for the relatively
small (53,000 gallons) and more localized spill from the COSCO
BUSAN in San Francisco Bay was expected to take up to five years to
complete.o It therefore seems likely that the completion date for the
BP Macondo oil spill assessments will be a decade or more away.
NRD claim litigation might therefore stretch into the 2020s.
D Assessing Natural Resources Damage: The NOAA Regulations
Recognizing the complexity of natural resource damage
assessment and restoration planning, Congress, in OPA 90, directed
the Secretary of Commerce to promulgate regulations for carrying out
such assessments and restoration planning for spills covered by the
75. Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 E3d 767, 776-77, 779 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Appendix at 780-81, Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 E3d 767 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1096). Although the NOAA regulations treated this as an "injury"
determination, it is more properly viewed as a causation test, particularly because it
apparently presumes an adverse change in the resource. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.51(b)(2); 61
Fed. Reg. 440, 450-51 (1996) (to be codified at 15 C.ER. pt. 990).
76. Gen. Elec. Co., 128 F3d at 777 (internal quotation marks omitted). In response
to a suggestion that the NOAA final rule adopted a "contributing factor" standard of
causation, the agency stated that "NOAA does not believe it is appropriate to advocate legal
standards of causation in the rule." 61 Fed. Reg. at 479.
77. Gen. Elec. Co., 128 F3d at 777.
78. Id at 779.
79. 33 U.S.C. § 2717(f)(1)(B) (2006); see also id. § 2712(h)(2) (limitation period for
NRD claims against the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund). Claims for other damages must be
brought within three years after the date on which the loss and the connection of the loss with
the discharge in question are reasonably discoverable with the exercise of due care. Id
§ 2717(f)(1)(A).
80. See United States v. M/V Cosco Busan, 557 E Supp. 2d 1058, 1066, 2008 AMC
1360, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 2008); see also I re Settoon Towing LLC, No. 07-1263, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 113530, at *15-16 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2009) (observing that NRDA can take
"quite some time").
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Act.81  After a lengthy development, deliberation, and challenge
process, NOAA promulgated the final rule called for by OPA 90 in
1996,82 and amended it in 2002." The NOAA regulations divide NRD
assessment into three phases: Phase I Preassessment,84 Phase II
Restoration Planning," and Phase III Restoration and Implementa-
tion." The NOAA regulations must be read in conjunction with
guidance available in NOAA's Damage Assessment, Remediation, and
Restoration Program (DARRP) manuals" and the NPFC's rules on
NRD claims against the Fund."
Several aspects of the NOAA regulations deserve close attention.
Under the regulations, "[jnjury means an observable or measurable
adverse change in a natural resource or impairment of a natural
resource service." 89 NOAA explained that injury to resources will not
be presumed and that the injury must be observable (i.e., qualitative) or
measurable (i.e., quantitative)."8 The regulations also establish a
"reliable and valid" standard for NRD assessments." In the absence of
81. See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1).
82. See generally6l Fed. Reg. 440-510 (1996) (to be codified at 15 C.ER. pt. 990);
60 Fed. Reg. 39,804-834 (1995) (to be codified at 15 C.ER. pt. 990).
83. Upon challenge by a number of industry groups, the 1996 regulations were, for
the most part, upheld. See Gen. Elec. Co., 128 E3d at 779. In response to the court's vacatur
and remand of selected parts of the 1996 final rule, NOAA promulgated amendments to
selected parts of the regulations in 2002. See 67 Fed. Reg. 61,483 (2002) (to be codified at
15 C.F.R. pt. 990).
84. 15 C.ER. § 990.40-.45 (2010).
85. Id. § 990.50-.56.
86. Id § 990.60-.66.
87. OPA Guidance About DARRP NOAA (July 19, 2010), http://www.darrp.
noaa.gov/library/ld.html. As of 2010, NOAA had published five manuals titled "NOAA
Guidance Document[s] for Natural Resource Damage Assessments [NRDA] Under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990." Id.
88. See33 C.FR. pt. 136 (2010).
89. 15 C.ER. § 990.30 ("injury" not defined in OPA 90). The NOAA regulations go
on to say: "Injury may occur directly or indirectly to a natural resource and/or service. Injury
incorporates the terms 'destruction,' 'loss,' and 'loss of use' as provided in OPA." Id The
NOAA definition of "injury" represents a departure from Clean Water Act thinking, under
which harm is presumed if oil is visible on or in the water. Cf 40 C.ER. § 110.3(b) (2010).
The visible sheen test was upheld in Chevron, USA., Inc. v Yost(Chevron I), 919 E2d 27,
28 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding civil penalty based on visible sheen), overruling United States
v. Chevron Oil Co. (Chevron 1), 583 E2d 1357, 1359, 1979 AMC 602, 603 (5th Cir. 1978)
(holding that visible sheen creates only a rebuttable presumption of harm).
90. 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 447 (1996) (to be codified at 15 C.ER. pt. 990).
91. 15 C.ER. § 990.27(a)(3). The terms "reliable" and "valid" "refer to technical
judgments by experts in a particular field that a procedure is consistent with best practices for
the measure being investigated under the circumstances." 61 Fed. Reg. at 465. NOAA did
not discuss where such "best practices" might be found. The court held that the most
important factor in evaluating the rebuttable presumption given to NRD assessment under the
NOAA regulations was that the assessment procedures must be reliable and valid for the
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reliable baseline data, this standard will be difficult to meet. Nearly
two decades ago, NOAA encouraged all natural resource trustees to
obtain baseline data on their resources at risk and to identify areas of
particular sensitivity.92  From the trustee's point of view, the
requirement imposes a Catch-22: to be able to determine whether an
injury occurred, the trustee needs baseline data for comparison. By
definition, such data must be obtained before the oil impacts the
resource. OPA 90 provides no mechanism for trustees to be
reimbursed for obtaining that baseline data at the time it is obtained.
Nor may the trustee recover the costs of historical baseline data
collection as part of its NRD assessment because those prespill costs
did not "result from" the spill incident." It is also noteworthy that the
NOAA regulations impose a cost-effectiveness consideration on the
trustees' approach to NRD assessment.94 An assessment method is
cost-effective if it is "the least costly activity . . . that provide[s] the
same or a comparable level of benefits. " OPA 90's NRD assessment
provisions are not a license for far-reaching environmental studies at
the RP's expense."
OPA 90 specifies that trustees may recover only "reasonable"
assessment costs." Significantly, the "reasonableness" qualification is
not included in OPA 90's provisions on recovering removal costs."
Attorney's fees that may be necessary to enforce a claim against an RP
are not recoverable assessment costs." The 1996 NOAA rule's
definition of "reasonable assessment costs" originally included both
"legal" and "enforcement" costs;'o however, the United States Court of
particular incident. Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 E3d 767, 771 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
92. See 57 Fed. Reg. 8964, 8984-85 (1992) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. ch. IX).
93. The cost of obtaining baseline data after the spill incident begins, but before the
oil impacts the natural resource, should be recoverable.
94. 15 C.F.R. § 990.27; 61 Fed. Reg. at 464.
95. 15 C.ER. § 990.30; see also 61 Fed. Reg. at 448-49, 451 (listing the factors for
identifying natural resources and services at risk and the selection of injuries to include in the
assessment).
96. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 451 ("[D]eveloping scientific knowledge for its own sake is
not part of an assessment under this rule."). NOAA has taken the position that its "focus on
restoration will eliminate unneeded assessment studies." Id. at 459. The rule "clearly
constrain[s] trustees' actions to those necessary to achieve OPA's restoration goals." Id.
97. See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1)(C) (2006).
98. See id. § 2702(b)(1).
99. Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Left open is whether an RP who challenges a trustee's administrative determination and
qualifies as a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the EAJA, might be able to recover
some of its attorney's fees. See28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006).
100. 60 Fed. Reg. 39,804, 39,810 (1995) (to be codified at 15 C.ER. pt. 990).
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Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated that part of the final rule. 0'
The superseding regulations promulgated by NOAA in 2002 clarified
the matter by deleting "enforcement" costs in the definition of
"reasonable assessment costs" and adding a definition of "legal costs"
that did not include attorney's fees necessary to bring an enforcement
action.02 The 2002 Federal Register discussion acknowledged that
"NOAA agreed that attorneys' costs incurred in pursuing litigation of a
natural resource damages claim are not recoverable as assessment
costs."'03 By contrast, courts have ruled that the government is entitled,
under some circumstances, to recover its attorney's fees in an action to
enforce a claim to recover its removal costs."
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NRD ASSESSMENTS
Most potential NRD assessment and restoration claims are
obviated either by cooperation and negotiation between the trustees
and the RP or by settlement.' The NOAA regulations require the
trustees to invite the RP to participate in NRD assessments "as soon as
practicable."'' Indeed, NOAA envisions early and active involvement
of the RP"' Accordingly, an RP has several options for approaching
NRD assessments and restoration planning following a spill incident.
First, the RP can simply trust the trustees to assess the damages
correctly and then pay the amount demanded when the trustees
complete the task. Alternatively, the RP can stand on the sidelines
while the trustees conduct their assessment, but then challenge the
trustees' findings when a claim is presented. A third option open to
the RP is to retain an independent NRD assessment team to conduct an
assessment and then use those findings to contest the trustees'
assessment. The fourth, and more common approach, is for the RP to
101. See Gen. Elec. Co., 128 E3d at 776 (observing that NOAA "does not oppose a
vacatur of the definition of assessment costs to the extent that it refers to attorneys' fees
incurred in pursuing litigation of a [NRD] claim").
102. See 67 Fed. Reg. 61,483, 61,490 (2002) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990); see
also 33 C.F.R. § 136.105(e)(8) (2010) (excluding "attorney's fees or other administrative costs
associated with preparation of the claim" under NPFC rules for claims against the Fund).
103. 67 Fed. Reg. at 61,490; Gen. Elec. Co., 128 E3d at 776.
104. SeeUnited States v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 172 E3d 1187, 1192-93, 1999
AMC 1521, 1528 (9th Cir. 1999).
105. 15 C.F.R. § 990.25 (2010) permits settlement at any time, "provided that the
settlement is adequate in the judgment of the trustees to satisfy the goal of OPA and is fair,
reasonable, and in the public interest." See also 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 446 (1996) (to be codified
at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990).
106. 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c).
107. 61 Fed. Reg. at 443.
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cooperate with the trustees in conducting the assessment and
restoration planning (as the NOAA regulations encourage), share and
compare data with the trustees, and raise any objections to the trustees'
methods or findings immediately."' For obvious reasons, trustees (and,
probably, the courts), knowing that the RP will likely reject first
approach, favor the fourth approach over the second or third.'"
Those NRD claims that fail to settle may lead to claims against
the Fund or a civil suit by the trustees against the RP or its guarantor.
Under those circumstances, the NPFC or a court will be called upon to
determine the validity of the asserted claims and to grant relief in a
way that guards against "double recovery" by two or more trustees for
the same damage.' The judicial reception (and the reception by the
NPFC) given to the trustees' NRD assessment will depend in large
measure on whether the assessment was conducted in accordance with
the NOAA regulations for NRD assessments. The effect of such
assessments was the focus of one section of H.R. 3534.
A. Judicial Review Under the Present Regine: The Rebuttable
Presumption
At present, NRD determinations or assessments prepared in
accordance with the NOAA regulations are entitled to a rebuttable
presumption. More specifically, OPA 90 provides:
Rebuttable presumption
Any determination or assessment of damages to natural resources for
the purposes of this Act made under subsection (d) of this section by a
Federal, State, or Indian trustee in accordance with the regulations
promulgated under paragraph (1) shall have the force and effect of a
rebuttable presumption on behalf of the trustee in any administrative or
judicial proceeding under this Act."'
The Act does not specify the content of that presumption, and the
NOAA regulations simply repeat the terms of the Act."' In the related
108. Because most NRD claims for incidents falling under OPA 90 are resolved short
of litigation, there are few cases construing and applying the NOAA regulations on NRD
assessments.
109. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584 (2006), may
provide for options short of litigation to resolve disputes with federal agencies serving as
trustees. Section 572(a) provides that upon agreement of the parties, agencies "may" use
ADR methods to resolve disputes that relate to "administrative programs."
110. See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(3) (2006).
111. Id. § 2706(e)(2); 15 CER. § 990.13.
112. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.13. The presumption applies even to assessments by state
and tribal trustees (but not foreign trustees) if they were made in accordance with the NOAA
regulations. See 60 Fed. Reg. 39,804, 39,808 (1995) (to be codified at 15 C.ER. pt. 990).
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Federal Register explanation of the final rule, NOAA asserted that it
"interprets this presumption to mean that the responsible parties have
the burdens of presenting alternative evidence on damages and of
persuading the fact finder that the damages presented by the trustees
are not an appropriate measure of damages.""' That characterization
appears to overstate the effect of a rebuttable presumption-at least
under federal law."' Presumptions in federal question cases in federal
courts are governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 301.
Rule 301. Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and Proceedings
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act
of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast. 15
Putting aside for now the question "presumption of what? " left
unanswered by the statute, close inspection of Rule 301 reveals that a
rebuttable presumption in a federal question matter like OPA 90 NRD
liability shifts to the RP only the burden of production, not the risk of
nonpersuasion, which would remain on the trustee. To meet the
burden of persuasion, the trustee must persuade the trier of fact as to
each element of its claim by the governing legal standard.16 Typically,
the most difficult elements for the trustee to prove are extent of injury
and causation."' The D.C. Circuit's decision in GeneralElectric Co. v
The regulations set out a five-part test for determining whether assessments by state, local,
and tribal trustees were conducted in accordance with the NOAA regulations. Id.
113. See 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 443 (1996) (emphasis added) (to be codified at 15 C.ER.
pt. 990). It goes on to add "[tihis presumption applies to all assessment procedures
conducted in accordance with this rule." Id.
114. In part I of the Federal Register materials on the final rule, NOAA took the
position that the "[rebuttable] presumption means that the responsible parties have the burden
of proving that the trustees' claim and determinations are incorrect." 60 Fed. Reg. at 39807
(emphasis added). However, many of the elements of a "claim" for natural resource damage
are beyond the scope of an "assessment" of that damage. Those elements must be considered
in pleadings (see FED. R. Civ. P. 8, 9; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))
and motion practice under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 56.
115. FED.R.EviD.301.
116. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 772 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
117. This is true even if the trustees followed the NOAA NRDA rule in 15 C.F.R. pt.
990 because any presumption that arises under 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(2) (2006) is rebuttable.
Accordingly, the methods and models adopted by the trustee must be evaluated not only
under the NOAA NRDA regulations but also the Federal Rule of Evidence 702-Daubert
factors, to predict the likelihood that a court will deem the trustee's proof admissible and
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US Department of Commerce took care to record that NOAA
conceded in oral argument before the court that before it could recover
for NRD, it would have to prove that the damage claimed was caused
by the incident."'
R Judicial Review Under the ProposedAmendment: TheAPA
Standard
Section 706 of H.R. 3534 would have implemented the White
House proposal to revise the legal effect of NRD assessments made for
spills falling within OPA 90. As amended, the relevant OPA 90
subsection would substitute APA-style judicial review of NRD
assessments for the rebuttable presumption. The amended version (in
redline format) would provide:
33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(2) Rebuttable presumption Judicial review of
assessments
Any determination or assessment of damages to natural resources for
the purposes of this Act made under subsection (d) of this section by a
Federal, State, or Indian trustee in accordance with the regulations
promulgated under paragraph (1) shall have the ferce and efct of-a
rebufttable presumptien on behalf of the trustee int any adminfistrative -of
judicial preeding under this At be subject to judicial review under
subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code (commonly
know as the Administrative Procedure Act), on the basis of the
administrative record developed by the lead Federl trustee as provided
in such regulations.119
In replacing the presumption with judicial review under the APA in
this way, the proposed amendment suffers from poor drafting, presents
application problems, and may prove vulnerable to constitutional
challenge if it is applied in a way that relieves a trustee of its burden of
proof on a claim for NRD. The drafting problems are immediately
apparent. First, the new provision, like the White House proposal, was
captioned "judicial review," a phrase that, under the APA, is normally
confined to final agency action carrying inherent legal effect (e.g.,
adequate. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993); see also
U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND RESTORATION
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT 15 (2007), available at http://restoration.doi.
gov/Assets/UploadedFiles/Library/facamtg5fmalreport.pdf ("It is important for DOI to
consider the standards for reliability embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the often
novel scientific and technical issues confronted in NRDAR.").
118. See Gen.Elec. Co., 128 F.3dat 777.
119. Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, H.R. 3534,
111th Cong., tit. III, § 706 (2009).
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rules, orders, licenses, sanctions), not to damage assessments that are
given binding legal effect only by later court judgment.'20 It thus leaves
unclear the relationship between "judicial review" and proof of claim
for damages and might be applied in a way that confuses and
ultimately debases both.2 ' Nothing in the language of the amendment
directly speaks to the burden of production or persuasion in a civil
action to collect natural resource restoration costs and damages.'22
Additionally, the amended section does not say that the trustee's
decisions and assessments are subject to judicial review "only" under
the APA, or what standard will be applied if the administrative record
developed by the lead federal trustee fails to address evidentiary
questions essential to a damage liability finding.'23 The amendment
also does not limit the opportunity to demand judicial review of a
trustee's NRD determinations or assessments to challenges by the RP
or its guarantor in response to a demand for payment by the trustee. It
could therefore be read to create a new basis for members of the
public'24 (or other trustees) to challenge a federal, state, or tribal
trustee's determination or assessment (and, perhaps, to recover their
attorney's fees if they prevail).'25 Finally, the amended statute would be
120. See5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 703-704 (2006).
121. It is important to note that the amendment would not alter the elements of a NRD
claim, the standing requirement for such claims, or the OPA 90 jurisdiction and venue
provisions. Thus, it would still be true that only trustees could bring claims for NRD
resulting from a spill by the RP and that such claims could be brought in federal or state
court. Upon proof of the elements of a claim (and subject to any available affirmative
defenses), the trustee may recover for the damage, including reasonable assessment costs, up
to the RP's limits of liability.
122. It is not clear how the amendment would affect the burden allocation in a motion
for summary judgment under FED. R. Civ P. 56 or in a declaratory action under 33 U.S.C.
§ 2717(f)(2). For example, in reviewing evidence in a summary judgment motion, "the court
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). 33 U.S.C. § 2717(f)(2) appears to create a
right to request a declaratory judgment on liability for removal costs and damages "any time
after [removal] costs have been incurred." Thus, a court might be called upon to enter a
binding judgment on damages early in the case, a situation not well-suited to APA-style
"judicial review."
123. The controversy over the relationship of compliance with the NOAA regulations
and the necessity of proving causation in a NRD claim is described supra Part II.D. Similarly,
a trustee would ordinarily not be called upon to determine whether an affirmative defense
was available to the RP
124. Trustees have been criticized from both sides: by RPs and public interest
advocates. See, e.g., Kevin R. Murray et al., Natural Resource Damage Trustees: Whose
Side Are They Really On.29 5 ENVTL. LAW 407 (1999); Laura Rowley, Note, NRD Trustees:
To WhatExtentAre They Truly Trustees. 28 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 459 (2001).
125. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently declined to
extend APA review to decisions by the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission on the
ground that it was not an "agency" under the APA. In doing so, it cast some doubt on the
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unnecessarily confusing because the APA judicial review provisions
are set out in chapter 7 of the Act, not chapter 5, as stated in the bill.'26
In particular, 5 U.S.C. § 706 prescribes the scope of review and the
grounds for setting aside a covered agency's actions, findings, or
conclusions. It provides in relevant part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
"quasi-federal agency" doctrine. See New York v. Atl. States Marine Fisheries Comm'n, 609
F.3d 524, 533-35 (2d Cir. 2010).
126. H.R. 3534 differed from the version submitted by the White House, which
provided that such assessments and determinations would "be subject to judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.) on the basis of the administrative
record developed by the Lead Administrative Trustee as provided in such regulations." See
Letter from Barack Obama, President, to Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, supra
note 22, at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). If, upon presentment, the RP denies all
liability for the claim or fails to settle it within 90 days, the Act's "election" provision gives
the claimant two options: present the claim to the Fund (whereupon the Fund is subrogated
to the claimant's claim against the RP under 33 U.S.C. § 2715) or "commence an action in
court against the responsible party or guarantor." 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c). Presumably, the
"action" contemplated by the statute is a "civil action" within the meaning of FED. R. Civ. P. 2,
with the pleading and proof requirements, discovery, and motion practice that entails.
Construing the amendment as replacing what is understood to be a civil action with an action
merely for a review of an administrative record would have a number of consequences. For
example, the lay-down disclosure obligations in FED. R. Civ. P 26(a) do not apply to actions
for review of an administrative record. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B)(i).
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In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the
whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall
be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. 27
Should Congress enact such an amendment without addressing these
drafting problems, NOAA might be called upon to remedy some of
those problems when it promulgates the conforming amendments to its
NRD regulations.128
Looking beyond the drafting problems raised above to how the
new rule would work in practice, several additional problems present
themselves. The first is one of symmetry among cognate acts
designed to protect natural resources from pollution damage because
the amendment would apply only to assessments conducted in
response to OPA 90 oil spills. NRD assessments for hazardous
substance releases under the Department of Interior regulations
promulgated under CERCLA would still be governed by the rebuttable
presumption.129  Second, although the APA by its terms applies to
federal agencies,'o the proposed amendment would extend APA
judicial review to "determinations" and "assessments" by state and
tribal trustees, individuals or agencies that are generally not subject to
the same congressional oversight and statutory safeguards that apply to
federal administrative agencies.'' Third, it is unclear whether the
jurisdictional and prudential limitations on judicial review that
typically apply to APA cases will apply to NRD determinations and, if
so, how they will relate to the jurisdiction and venue provisions of
OPA 90.132 Fourth, the court reviews questions of law de novo, subject
127. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
128. The National Pollution Funds Center might also need to amend its rules for
compensation from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. See generally 33 C.FR. § 136.209
(2010).
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C) (2006); 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (2007); see also 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1432(6), 1443 (2006) (NRD liability provisions of the National Marine Sanctuaries Act).
Trustees who fail to comply with the DOI regulations for NRD assessments run a serious risk
in litigating their NRD claim without the benefit of the presumption. See, e.g., New Mexico
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1242 (10th Cir. 2006).
130. See5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1), 701(b)(1).
131. Any statute that purports to create a right to a civil action against a state must be
mindful of the Eleventh Amendment.
132. The Supreme Court has held that 5 U.S.C. § 702 is not a jurisdictional statute for
judicial review of agency actions. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
Accordingly, in the absence of a statute directly on point, federal jurisdiction will generally be
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY
KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 103 (6th ed. 2002). OPA 90 has its own jurisdiction and
venue provisions for "all controversies arising under" the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 2717(b) (2006).
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to applicable deference doctrines,'" while the standard of review for
findings of fact varies according to the form of the proceeding. As
H.R. 3534 was drafted, it was unclear whether the NRD
determinations or assessments would be subject to the substantial
evidence standard under section 706(2)(e) of the APA'34 or some lesser
standard.' If the "judicial review" prescribed by the amendment does
not contemplate de novo review of the relevant facts (and nothing in
the bill indicated that it would), an argument can be made that
determinations and assessments should be carried out under
procedures that conform to the APA adjudication requirements.'
Fifth, it is not clear whether the APA review standard would be binding
on the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund managers if the trustee presents a
NRD claim to the NPFC.'" Sixth, there was nothing in the bill that
suggests the sponsors carefully considered the potential preclusive
effect of the trustee's NRD determinations in any subsequent
proceedings involving the trustee, RP, or third parties who might be
liable on contribution or indemnity theories.'
The proposed amendment might also be vulnerable to a
constitutional challenge (implicating the other form of "judicial
review") if applied in a way that fails to meet due process
133. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
134. Section 706(2)(e) applies only when a "hearing" is required by 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)
(when rules are required by statute to be made on the record after an opportunity for an
agency hearing) or 5 U.S.C. § 554 (agency adjudications).
135. This, too, might be clarified by NOAA in the revision to its NRD regulations that
would be required by this amendment.
136. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(1) (explaining that the section on "adjudications" applies
except, inter alia, where the "matter is subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de
novo in a court").
137. The rebuttable presumption applies in both administrative and judicial
proceedings. By contrast, the substitute provision is limited to "judicial" review. It is also
significant that the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund managers serve a fiduciary role. The
deferential APA review standard may be inconsistent with the degree of care expected of a
fiduciary before it pays out moneys from a public "trust fund."
138. "An administrative decision commands preclusive effects only if it resulted from
a procedure that seems an adequate substitute for judicial procedure." 18B CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4475 (2d ed. 2002). Preclusion may
also extend beyond the agency directly involved. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-03 (1940) (stating that litigation conducted before one agency or
official is generally binding on another agency or official of the same government because
officers of the same government are in privity with each other). Note, too, the preclusive
effect accorded to state court judgments in 33 U.S.C. § 2717(c) (2006). See also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (requiring that federal courts give full faith and credit to the judgments of state
courts). Whether federal courts are bound by state administrative determinations is
determined in part by legislative intent. See Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501
U.S. 104, 110 (1991).
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requirements'" or infringes on an RP's right to trial by jury. Although
Part IV of this Article concludes that the jury trial right is likely to
attach in relatively few NRD claims, the proposed amendment failed
to recognize or make accommodation for the right in those cases when
it does apply. Courts adjudicating claims for NRD would therefore
have been challenged to craft an approach that gave effect to the
amendment without compromising jury trial rights.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
The application and effect of the proposed amendment must be
evaluated not only in terms of what it would add ("judicial review"
under the APA) but also what it would strike from the statute: a
rebuttable presumption, which may be applied in the context of a civil
claim for damage to natural resources. The APA is understood to
embrace three categories of administrative actions by federal agencies:
rulemaking, adjudications, and a third category of actions consisting of
agency decisions, sometimes referred to as "informal actions," that do
not fall within the definition of rulemaking or adjudications.'40 The
APA prescribes specific procedures for rulemaking and adjudications,
but not for the third category of decisions. Nevertheless, the APA's
judicial review provisions apply, at least in part, to all three categories
of agency action.14' H.R. 3534 would have extended such review to a
trustee's NRD "determinations and assessments," even if they were
made or carried out by state or tribal trustees. It also appears that it
would limit review to the "administrative record developed by the lead
Federal trustee as provided in [the NOAA] regulations." 42 This new
approach to determining and assessing damages against private parties
would raise significant due process and jury trial right questions.
139. Determinations regarding the level of process due before a person can be
deprived of property include the public and private interests that may be affected by the
decision, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the probable value of additional or alternative
safeguards. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
140. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WLLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 254-55
(2d ed. 2001). Other than development and implementation of restoration plans (discussed
fia note 144 and accompanying text), trustee decisions with respect to NRD arising out of
an OPA 90 spill incident likely do not fall within the definition of a "rule" under the APA.
See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). Nor do they constitute an "order" under 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) for
purposes of applying the proposed amendment, which would trigger application of the
agency adjudications requirements in 5 U.S.C. § 554.
141. See5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704.
142. Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, H.R. 3534,
111th Cong., tit. III, § 706 (2009).
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A. ExisthngAppicadon ofAPA Review Standards in OPA 90
Incidents
Application of the APA to some aspects of OPA 90 spill incidents
is hardly new. The OPA 90 process for obtaining compensation for
damages to natural resources was described by one district court as a
"hybrid administrative-judicial" process.14 OPA 90 prescribes what
amounts to a formal rulemaking process for NRD restoration plans,
requiring that such plans be developed and implemented "only after
adequate public notice, opportunity for a hearing, and consideration of
all public comment."'" NOAA's NRD regulations formalize that
process and require trustees to compile an administrative record.'45
APA judicial review standards have been applied to the federal
government's claims for reimbursement of removal costs. In United
States v Hyuandai Merchant Marine Co., for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the APA
"arbitrary and capricious" standard and held that the government was
entitled to recover all of its costs of removal, without first proving the
costs were necessary or reasonable.1' Recognizing that the actions
were taken by an agency of the federal government, however, the court
went on, in an attempt to allay the RP's concerns, to explain:
143. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Glacier Petroleum, Inc., No. CIVA. 00-
2165-CM, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6926, at *2 (D. Kan. May 2, 2001).
144. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c)(5) (2006); see id § 2706(c)(1)(C), (c)(2)(B), (c)(3)(B),
(c)(4)(B). By providing an opportunity for a hearing, the statute triggers application of 5
U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) ("When rules are required by statute to be
made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title
apply . . . .").
145. 15 C.ER. §§ 990.45, 900.61 (2010); see also 40 C.ER. § 300.800 (2010)
(referring to NCP provisions for Administrative Record of response activities); William S.
Roush, Jr., Procedual Options for the Process ofAssessing and Collectig Natua Resource
Damages Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 315 (1993). Judicial
review under the APA extends to the "whole record or those parts of it cited by a party." 5
U.S.C. § 706; see Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985) ("The task
of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706, to
the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court."). In
promulgating its final rule and NRD assessments, NOAA took no position on whether any
judicial review of the trustees' NRDA determinations will be limited to the administrative
record. 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 479 (1996) (to be codified at 15 C.FR. pt. 990).
146. 172 F.3d 1187, 1191, 1999 AMC 1521, 1527 (9th Cir. 1999); see also H. REP. NO.
101-242 (1989) (intending that the definition of "removal costs" be interpreted liberally and
that only measures that are clearly extravagant, clearly and predictably ineffectual, frivolous,
or grossly out of proportion to the actual or threatened pollution should be excluded); Sergio
J. Alarcon & Flynn M. Jennings, Monitonng Costs Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 A
Blank Check for the Coast Guar, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 419, 429-32 (1997).
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Recovery under the OPA is not wholly unlimited, however. The
government concedes that the general standard of the Administrative
Procedure Act applies to its actions in seeking to prevent or contain an
oil-spill disaster: the United States may recover its costs unless its
actions were arbitrary or capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The
district court held that the actions of the United States for which it
awarded recovery were not arbitrary or capricious. Hyundai does not
challenge these rulings. The OPA does not authorize the imposition of
any higher standard.47
Other courts have followed the Ninth Circuit's approach. In United
States v Jones, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Georgia held that even if the Coast Guard's actions for which the
reimbursement is sought were not "consistent" with the National
Contingency Plan, they are recoverable unless the actions were
arbitrary or capricious.'48 The court treated as affinnative defenses the
defendant's claims that the government's costs were not recoverable
because its removal actions were not consistent with the NCP, were
unreasonable, or because a claim had not been properly presented to
the RP.' The courts have also applied an APA review standard to
NPFC actions.'
B. Legal and Pratical Challenges in ApplyingAPA Standards in
NRD Liigation
Given the likelihood that the new "judicial review" provisions of
H.R. 3534 would have been clarified or fleshed out by NOAA (when
called upon to amend its NRD regulations to conform to the
amendments to OPA 90), it is premature to delve deeply into the APA
issues the amendment would have raised. However, because it is likely
that a similar amendment will be forthcoming, several issues should be
147. HyundaiMerch. Marine, 172 F.3d at 1191, 1999AMCat 1526-27.
148. 267 E Supp. 2d 1349, 1363 (M.D. Ga. 2003) ("[T]o say that the government has
unlimited power to recover any costs is also unfounded. Defendants may subject the
[government's] removal actions to judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act.").
The district court cited a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in support of the proposition that when an agency decision is challenged under the arbitrary
and capricious standard the burden is on the challenging party to show that the agency's
decision was either not based on a consideration of the relevant factors or amounted to a clear
error ofjudgment. Id. (citing Ward v. Campbell, 610 E2d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 1980)).
149. HyundaiMerch. Marine, 172 F3d. at 1362.
150. Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 208 E Supp. 2d 642, 649, 2002 AMC 493, 500
(E.D. La. 2002); see also John M. Woods, Going on Twenty Yeas-The Oil Spill Pollution
Act of 1990 and Clains Against the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, 83 TUL. L. REv 1323,
1331-32, 1337 (2009) (concluding that courts are less willing to give deference to
determinations by the NPFC).
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flagged for continuing attention. To put the importance of this brief
list of issues in perspective, it might be instructive to consider a
possibility: the amendment could be adopted and applied in a manner
that in a future NOAA (or state or tribal) natural resource damage
claim against an RP (or its guarantor) for, say, $1 billion, the RP may
be afforded far less "process" than it would receive from the U.S.
Coast Guard in assessing a Class II civil penalty of $30,000 for the
same oil spill. Comparison of the APA standards for agency
adjudications,"' allied with the Coast Guard's regulations prescribing
the procedures and safeguards applicable in adjudications by
administrative law judges to impose Class II civil penalties,'52 to the
procedures and safeguards applicable in trustee natural resource
damage determinations and assessments, amply demonstrates that the
former process is much more likely to produce reliable findings of fact
and conclusions of law than the latter. The stark contrast and the
appearance of unfairness it creates are almost sure to give pause to
judges when asked to apply an APA "judicial review" standard to
establish the essential elements of a billion dollar claim, particularly if
the trustee is not a federal agency bound by the safeguards prescribed
by the AEA. 53
The APA judicial review standards themselves suggest several
potential problems in applying the amendment. Under 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(C), a court might well be asked to determine whether some
parts of a trustee's NRD determination or assessment are ulta vires, to
the extent the trustee's "determinations" or "assessments" extend to
elements of a claim against the trustee that were not necessary
determinations for the trustee to carry out its assigned responsibilities.
NOAA could minimize this danger by defining "determination" and
"assessment" in its revision of the NRD regulations to avoid
determinations that overreach and by prescribing an appropriate
151. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2006).
152. 33 C.F.R. pt. 20 (2010); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (providing authority for
Class II civil penalties).
153. It is also noteworthy that the criminal fines for water pollution cases may, under
the Alternative Fines Act (AFA), be assessed on the basis of the pecuniary harm suffered as a
result of the violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 357 1(d) (2006). Following the 2007 oil spill from the
COSCO BUSAN in San Francisco Bay, the U.S. Department of Justice invoked the AFA and
obtained a grand jury indictment alleging that the defendant's negligent discharge of oil had
caused at least $20 million in pecuniary losses, presumably a figure that included the natural
resource damages. See Third Superseding Indictment, United States v. Fleet Mgmt. Ltd., CR
08-1050-SI, at 9 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/can/
community/Notifications/documents/2009_08_07_third sup indictment.pdf.
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process for each.'54 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) might also be construed to
inject any number of federal and state procedural requirements beyond
those in OPA 90 and the NOAA regulations. Application of 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(E) and (F) will be particularly problematic, more so if the
relevant trustee is a state or local government agency or a tribal
representative. Under those circumstances, chapter V of the APA does
not apply ex proprio vigore, and it is therefore unclear whether the
substantial evidence standard or the de novo factual review standard
would apply.'" Once again, NOAA might be able to address this
problem in rule amendments.
C Potential for Conflict with Juy Trial Rights
The OPA 90 liability scheme must, of course, respect any
relevant right to a jury trial that an alleged responsible party might
have. The Act provides a basis for injured parties to bring claims for
removal costs and damages in federal district courts or in state
courts."' Accordingly, in assessing the substitution of judicial review
for proof in a civil action using a rebuttable presumption, both federal
and state laws on the right to a jury trial might be implicated by the
amendment.' Within the federal courts, the right to a jury trial may
be found in the Seventh Amendment or an applicable statute."
1. The Right to Trial by Jury in Federal Courts
The Seventh Amendment provides, "In Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law."' The amendment does not
apply to cases within the federal courts' admiralty and maritime
154. Neither OPA 90 nor the NOAA regulations presently define either term, nor does
the APA define or use the term "determination" in its judicial review provisions (5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2) refers to agency "action, findings, and conclusion"), except in the last sentence of
section 706, in reference to "determinations" by the court. The CEQ regulations
implementing NEPA provide a definition of "environmental assessment." See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.9 (2010) (emphasis added).
155. See5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(F), 554(a)(1).
156. 33 U.S.C. § 2717(b)-(c) (2006).
157. The potential difficulties state courts might face if called upon to apply a federal
APA review to actions by federal, state, and tribal trustees is beyond the scope of this Article.
158. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ P 38(a).
159. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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jurisdiction, for which there is no right to a jury trial.' The Seventh
Amendment does not create a jury trial right, but rather "preserves"
that right.'6 1 Congress may also expressly create a right to a jury trial
by statute.'62 In Curtis v Loether, the United States Supreme Court
held that even where the statute is silent, courts will find the right to a
jury trial where the statute establishes "rights and remedies of the sort
typically enforced in an action at law.""' Because the OPA 90 claim
for natural resource damage is not a common law claim, and Congress
did not expressly create a right to a jury trial on such claims, any right
to a jury trial for an OPA 90 NRD claim must be founded on the
presence of a "legal" claim or issue under the Curtis v Loetherrule."
Common law actions are those involving "suits in which legal
rights [are] to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to
those where equitable rights alone [are] regarded.""' The Court has
held that its Seventh Amendment cases require trial by jury "in actions
unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves rights and
remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law, rather
than in an action in equity or admiralty."' 6 On the other hand, the
Court has also held that this requirement does not apply to statutory
proceedings unknown to the common law, such as an application to
enforce an order of an administrative body."' Atlas Roofing Co. v
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, a leading case
involving findings by a federal administrative body, may prove relevant
160. See FED. R. CIv P. 38(e); FED. R. Clv. P. 9(h) advisory committee's note (1966).
Congress has, by statute, created a right to a jury trial in admiralty cases arising on the Great
Lakes. See Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (2006));
see also Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 371, 1959 AMC 832, 845
(1959). But see Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20-21, 1963 AMC 1093, 1096
(1963) ("While this Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials
in admiralty cases, neither that Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution
forbids them.. .. Only one trier of fact should be used for the trial of what is essentially one
lawsuit to settle one claim split conceptually into separate parts because of historical
developments." (footnote omitted)).
161. See generally 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 2302-2306 (3d ed. 2008).
162. FED.R.CIV.P.38(a).
163. 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
164. The Court concluded that the damages action created by the statute in that case
"sounds basically in tort ... [it] merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to
compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's wrongful breach. [The action]
is analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at common law." Id.
165. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 434 (1830); see also Barton v. Barbour,
104 U.S. 126, 133 (1881).
166. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974).
167. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937).
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to the OPA 90 NRD cases.'" That case involved a jury demand by
Atlas with respect to a fine assessed by an administrative body under
authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). In
Atlas, Congress committed to an administrative body the authority to
determine whether a violation of the Act had occurred and the amount
of any penalty for the violation, while affording the party a right to
seek judicial review of the administrative determination in a federal
court of appeals. In ruling against Atlas's objection that the procedures
established by the Act violated its right to a jury trial, the Court relied
on the "public rights" rationale. The Court explained:
At least in cases in which "public rights" are being litigated-e.g., cases
in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce
public rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to
enact-the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from
assigning the factfinding function and initial adjudication to an
administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible. 6 1
The "public rights" doctrine and its "sovereign capacity" underpinning
do not exempt all penalty cases from the Seventh Amendment
precedents. In Tull v United States, for example, the Court held that
an alleged polluter had the right to a trial by jury in an action to
determine its liability for a civil penalty under the Clean Water Act;
however, the right did not extend to the assessment of the amount of
the penalty.'
The line between public and private rights is not always clear. In
Gmnfmanciem, S.A. v Nordberg, a case involving a "private claim" in
a bankruptcy court, the Court upheld Granfinanciera's assertion that it
had a jury trial right on a claim against it by the bankruptcy trustee to
recover funds fraudulently transferred."' In doing so, the Court held
that Congress "lacks the power to strip parties contesting matters of
private right of their constitutional right to a trial by jury" and then
went on to clarify the difference between public and private rights, a
distinction that could prove important in claims presented by tribal
trustees.7 2 The Court also held that the Seventh Amendment test for
168. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
169. Id. at 450. It is noteworthy that the Court characterized the agency procedure as
an "initial adjudication."
170. 481 U.S. 412,420,427-28 (1987).
171. 492 U.S. 33, 36 (1989).
172. Id. at 51-52 & n.8. In 1932, the Court in Crowell v Benson upheld a statute that
delegated adjudication authority over a "private" claim (by an injured worker against his
employer) to an administrative agency, as long as Congress permitted a "full opportunity" for
judicial review of the agency's legal conclusions and a less exacting review of its findings of
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whether a party has a right to a jury trial is the same as the Article III
test for whether Congress may assign adjudication of a claim to a non-
Article Ill tribunal, such as a bankruptcy court or administrative
tribunal.73
Liberal claim and joinder rules may result in postspill cases that
present a complex mix of common law, statutory and maritime claims
for removal costs and damages and include requests for legal,
equitable, and admiralty remedies. 74 In the so-called "mixed" cases,
presenting some issues for which there is a jury trial right and other
issues for which there is no such right, the Supreme Court's decision in
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v Westover charts the appropriate course."'
Beacon Theatres and its progeny stand for the proposition that the
courts are to accord the utmost solicitude to jury trial rights. Rejecting
the "cleanup doctrine," the Court in Dairy Queen, Inc. v Wood
emphasized that the presence of even one "legal" issue'7 1 for which
there is a right to a jury trial requires that a jury trial be afforded on the
factual questions related to that claim.'" Under the federal rules, when
a proper and timely jury demand has been made, all issues in the case
are presumptively tried to the jury."'7  Even where there is no right to a
jury trial, the rules permit the trial court to try issues with an advisory
jury!7
fact. 285 U.S. 22, 45-66, 1932 AMC 355, 363-78 (1932). With respect to findings of fact,
the Court noted that an "administrative method" could satisfy due process requirements
"assuming due notice, proper opportunity to be heard, and that findings are based upon
evidence." Id at 47, 1932 AMC at 364-65.
173. Id at 51-54, 1932 AMC at 368-70.
174. Among the joined NRD claims by the various trustees, some might be based in
part on determinations and assessments made in accordance with the NOAA regulations,
while others were not. Accordingly, the former category of claims would be subject to the
"judicial review" standard and the others would have to meet the applicable civil pleading and
proof standards, without benefit of the rebuttable presumption.
175. 359 U.S. 500, 510-11(1959).
176. The Court provided guidance on distinguishing legal and equitable issues in Ross
v Bernhard: "As our cases indicate, the 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by
considering, first, the pre-merger [of law and equity] custom with reference to such
questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of
juries." 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). The Court later explained that characterizing the
relief sought is more important than finding a precisely analogous common law cause of
action. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987).
177. 369 U.S. 469, 479 (1962). Pure questions of law are for the court, even in cases
in which questions of fact and mixed questions of law and fact are for the jury.
178. FED. R. Civ P. 39(a). The general rule has two exceptions: (1) when the parties or
their attomeys stipulate to a nonjury trial, and (2) when the court, on motion or on its own,
finds that there is no right to a jury trial on some or all of those issues.
179. FED. R. CIv P. 39(c)(1).
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2. Jury Trials in OPA 90 and CERCLA NRD Cases
Responsible parties have, on occasion, demanded a jury trial in
civil cases brought against them to recover removal costs or natural
resource damages under CERCLA or OPA 90."'o In response to
motions by the government to strike the RP's demand for a jury trial,
several federal district courts have been called upon to determine
whether the RP has a right to trial by jury in such cases.'"' The results
in those cases cast some doubt on the constitutionality of the "judicial
review" approach if it operates to defeat an RP's right to a jury trial on
a legal issue.
With few OPA 90 cases directly on point, the courts may be
forced to turn to CERCLA cases involving NRD claims for further
guidance on the RP's right to a jury trial.'82 For the most part, where
those NRD claims were limited to recovery for restoration and
rehabilitation costs, along with the cost of assessment, the courts
denied the defendants' demand.'"' By contrast, where the trustees'
claims were broadly stated to include all "damages" to "natural
resources," the courts granted the jury trial demand on the grounds that
some "legal" issues were included.'84
Like CERCLA, OPA 90 does not expressly create a statutory
right to a trial by jury in claims for removal costs or damages."' Faced
with the government's motion to strike an RP's jury trial demand in an
OPA 90 case, a district court held that the recovery of removal costs
under OPA 90 constitutes an equitable remedy, for which there is no
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, but that is not necessarily true
when the claim is for natural resource damage.'"' Finding no prior
cases examining whether an RP has a right to a jury trial on NRD
180. Trial by jury must be timely demanded or it is waived. FED. R. Civ P. 38(d),
39(b).
181. FED. R. Civ. P 38(a) "preserves" the right as provided by the Seventh Amendment
or federal statute.
182. Recall that the OPA 90 "judicial review" amendment would not apply to
CERCLA cases for natural resource damage; those CERCLA cases will continue to be
governed by the rebuttable presumption. Thus, the value of CERCLA cases as an analogy
will be limited.
183. See, e.g., In vAcushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 994, 999 (D.
Mass. 1989); United States v. Wade, 653 F. Supp. 11, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1984). See generaly
David Elbaum, Note, Judicial Review of Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under
CERCLA: Implications ofthe Right ofTrial by Jury, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 352 (1995).
184. See, eg., United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. 83-5898 SC (N.D. Cal. Sept.
14, 1984).
185. United States v. Viking Res., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 808, 830 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
186. Id. at 831-32 (analogizing to CERCLA cases).
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claims, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas first noted that OPA 90 explicitly provides that the costs of
restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of
damaged resources are to be included in the measure of natural
resource damages."' Drawing on CERCLA cases, the court held that
"at least one component of natural resource damages-the diminution
in value of those natural resources pending restoration-is legal in
nature."' 8 According to the court, "It amounts to compensating the
plaintiff for injury to its property, much like damages recovered in
nuisance or trespass-both classic legal causes of action."' Finding
that the trustee's NRD claim included at least one legal component, the
district court then applied the Supreme Court's Dairy Queen, Inc. v
Wood'" rule and denied the government's motion to strike the RP's
demand for a trial by jury.m'
D A Possible Way To Give Effect to Both?
Should a court find that an RP (or guarantor) has the right to a
jury trial on some or all of the issues in a trustee's NRD claim, the
federal courts will typically apply well-established canons of
construction and attempt to construe the amended statute in a manner
that would render its judicial review approach constitutional.'92 Is it
possible to give effect to the judicial review provision in a measure like
H.R. 3534 while respecting the right to a jury trial? One possible way
of doing so would be to apply the amendment in conjunction with
summary judgment practice. To the extent that "judicial review" of the
applicable administrative record establishes certain factual elements of
the trustee's claim against the RP by the evidentiary standards
applicable in summary judgments, the court might then determine that
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to those issues and that, as
a matter of law, the trustee is entitled to partial summary judgment on
187. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1)(A) (2006)).
188. Id. at 832.
189. Id (citing In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F Supp. 994, 999
(D. Mass. 1989), a CERCLA case).
190. 369 U.S. 469, 470 (1962) (holding that the Seventh Amendment jury trial right is
triggered by one legal component and is not lost even if that single legal issue is characterized
as "incidental" to the equitable issues).
191. VikrngRes., 607 F Supp. 2d at 832.
192. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 1932 AMC 355, 376 (1932) ("When the
validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.").
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the established facts.'93 Assuming that other factual elements of the
trustee's claim would have to be proven by conventional means
(evidence admitted at trial), the jury would then be instructed on the
established facts and charged to combine them with their findings on
the remainder of the factual elements and the instructions from the
court to reach a verdict on liability and damages. Whether the courts
would be willing to apply summary judgment procedure in this way is
uncertain.
V. CONCLUSION
Natural resource damage liability regimes are not an end in
themselves, but rather one means to restore and maintain the diversity
and health of ecosystems. Accordingly, the priorities in any statutory
scheme to protect the nation's natural resources from oil spills and
hazardous substances releases should be, first, prompt and reasonably
complete restoration and, second, prompt and accurate compensation
for the costs of restoration, diminution of value, and loss of use.
Trustees should also be compensated for the costs they incur in
restoration planning and execution, and damage assessment and
transaction costs should be minimized. These priorities must be
pursued within established principles of due process and civil
procedure practice and with respect for any applicable right to a jury
trial.
It falls to Congress and the implementing agencies to craft a
strategy to achieve the priorities, but in doing so they must be mindful
that if deterrence fails and if the responsible party thereafter fails for
some reason to agree to the trustees' restoration plans, it will fall to the
courts adjudicating the claims against the responsible party to
determine whether the resulting natural resource damage regime was
applied in a manner that meets the governing legal standards.
Congress and the trustees must appreciate that, in assessing
preferences between a rebuttable presumption and a standard of
judicial review, the trustees' choices grounded in a prevention-
restoration focus may not be compelling for the courts, with their
claims-litigation focus.
The White House and Congress might choose to call this new
approach "judicial review," as if the action being reviewed were an
ordinary APA rule or order, but the courts might see it as a problematic
193. Under FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2), the RP would have the opportunity to demonstrate
to the court that there was, in fact, a genuine issue of material fact.
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departure from well-established procedures for proving the elements of
an affirmative claim against a private party. In effect, the amendment
would ask the courts to grant virtual issue preclusion to findings
arrived at by a nonjudicial administrative process not bound by the
APA safeguards applicable to agency adjudications and without any
showing that those trustees are better prepared to grapple with the
recurring uncertainties that have characterized NRD determinations on
injury and causation. Given the federal government's poor track
record in estimating both the volume of the oil spilled from the BP
Macondo well and the amount of oil remaining in the Gulf waters
when the well was finally capped, some might reasonably question
whether the government trustees' NRD calculations should be subject
only to a deferential standard of review.
In the absence of a better drafted bill by Congress or substantial
rulemaking by NOAA that defines "determinations" and "assess-
ments" and prescribes adequate procedural safeguards for trustees to
follow in making such findings, federal and state courts would face a
difficult task in adjudicating claims for natural resource damage where
some elements of the claims find their source not in evidence admitted,
cross-examined and tested against rebuttal evidence in court, but rather
in a "review" of "determinations and assessments" by federal, state
and local agencies, and tribal trustees, with such determinations to be
found and substantiated in an as yet ill-defined "record." The fact that
this new approach to proving claims would likely apply retroactively to
the BP Macondo spill, the NRD claims of which may run into the
billions of dollars and will be asserted by a multitude of trustees,
should give pause to a serious student of due process and trial practice.
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